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The Ethics of Eliminating Harmful 
Species: The Case of the Tsetse Fly
JÉRÉMY BOUYER, NEIL H. CARTER, CHELSEA BATAVIA, AND MICHAEL PAUL NELSON
Wildlife species harmful to humans are often targets of control and elimination programs. A contemporary example is the tsetse fly, a vector 
of sleeping sickness and African animal trypanosomosis. Tsetse flies have recently been targeted by a pan-African eradication campaign. If it is 
successful, the campaign could push the entire tsetse family to extinction. With the emergence of effective and efficient elimination technologies, 
ethical assessment of proposed elimination campaigns is urgently needed. We examine the ethics of tsetse fly elimination by considering 
arguments predicated on both the instrumental and the intrinsic values of the species at local and global scales. We conclude that, although 
global eradication of tsetse flies is not ethically justified, localized elimination campaigns targeting isolated populations are ethically defensible. 
We urge assessments of this kind be conducted regularly and in context, so that all relevant factors underlying decisions on species elimination 
are routinely laid bare for evaluation.
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Humans have caused the extinction of wildlife   species worldwide, likely initiating a sixth mass extinc-
tion event (Ceballos et  al. 2015). The disappearance of 
most, if not all, of these species has been an unintended 
consequence of human population growth and related 
activities. Recognizing the value and significance of biodi-
versity, global efforts to halt or reverse species loss have been 
coordinated—for example, by the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and the United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity. Recently, however, humans have 
developed the technical capacities to purposefully eradi-
cate undesirable species, such as insect vectors of a variety 
of pathogens. Policymakers are now tasked to determine 
whether and to what ends such technologies should be used. 
The moral seriousness of this decision cannot be overstated. 
In the middle of the only known mass extinction to be 
caused by humans, all relevant factors underlying a deci-
sion to intentionally eliminate a species, whether a pest or 
not, should be laid bare and carefully evaluated as a part of 
responsible and informed ethical deliberation.
As part of such a deliberative process, in the present 
article, we examine and evaluate key arguments for and 
against the purposeful elimination of tsetse flies (figure  1 
and box 1), vectors of sleeping sickness and African animal 
trypanosomosis. Trypanosomosis is a major but neglected 
human disease and the main pathological constraint to 
cattle farming in approximately 10 million square kilome-
ters (km2) of tsetse fly–infested sub-Saharan Africa. Sixty 
million people are at risk of contracting sleeping sickness 
and the annual livestock and crop losses are estimated at 
$4750 million (Vreysen et  al. 2013). Despite considerable 
research, no vaccines for human and animal trypanoso-
mosis are yet available, so controlling the diseases requires 
controlling the tsetse fly vector (Bouyer et al. 2013, Solano 
et al. 2013), although this is still under debate for sleeping 
sickness. Numerous tsetse fly elimination programs have 
been established across Africa, many housed under the Pan 
African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign 
(PATTEC). Recently, six countries (Ghana, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia) were involved in the 
first phase of PATTEC (Simarro et  al. 2008). Other coun-
tries, including Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Botswana, have 
also successfully eliminated tsetse flies from part of or their 
full territory using sources of funding other than PATTEC 
(Kgori et al. 2006).
Many elimination programs target populations of non-
native species (Simberloff 2009), which can cause severe 
ecological damage, including the loss of endemic species 
(Clout and Veitch 2002). These programs are generally non-
controversial (Myers JH et al. 2000). Tsetse fly elimination, 
on the other hand, is an interesting and potentially more 
controversial case study for ethical analysis. Tsetse flies are 
endemic, with a complex biology and unique evolution-
ary history. For example, they have a unique reproduction 
system (box 1), close to that of mammals, with ovovivipar-
ity and lactation of the larvae, which they share only with 
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the biological group of pupiparous insects (Hippoboscidae, 
Streblidae, Nycteribiidae; Solano et al. 2010). Tsetse flies also 
have learning capacities (Bouyer et al. 2007), as is evidenced 
by their preferential return to the first host species they feed 
on for ulterior blood meals. However, although they are bio-
logically and evolutionarily remarkable, tsetse flies are also 
specific vectors of diseases with a large detrimental impact 
on human well-being (box 2). Furthermore, given sufficient 
political and financial support, tsetse flies can now be elimi-
nated locally and possibly even eradicated worldwide. As 
a basic rule of ethics, however, can does not imply should. 
We suggest a full ethical evaluation of tsetse fly elimination 
is essential to support sound decision-making around the 
usage of new technologies, to assess whether or under what 
conditions elimination of an endemic species harmful to 
humans might be justified.
Background: Feasibility of tsetse fly elimination
The development of efficient technologies (box 3) has made 
the elimination of tsetse fly populations more feasible than 
in the past (Dicko et  al. 2014). Already several countries 
have succeeded in eliminating tsetse flies in a large part 
of their original distribution area (one-third in Zimbabwe, 
with progress ongoing; Murwira et al. 2010). Local popula-
tions of Glossina austeni have already been eliminated in 
Zanzibar using the sterile insect technique (SIT; Vreysen 
et al. 2014), and populations of Glossina morsitans centralis 
have been eliminated in the Okavango Delta of Botswana 
using the sequential aerosol technique (SAT; Kgori et  al. 
2006). Isolated areas in Senegal, such as the Niayes (fig-
ure  2), have had tsetse fly populations eliminated as well, 
and efforts are underway to eliminate all Glossina palpalis 
gambiensis populations in a 1000 km2 target area using inno-
vative technologies, including the aerial release of chilled 
adult sterile males with an automatic release machine (Dicko 
et al. 2014).
The alternative to elimination is integrated control of 
trypanosomosis by farmers, with the aim of reducing tsetse 
fly densities below the detection threshold or to levels com-
patible with cost-effective cattle production (Bouyer et  al. 
2013). This alternative strategy relies on the combined use 
of trypanocides and control of the vector through insecti-
cide treatment of cattle (ITC) and insecticide treated targets 
(ITT). However, the adoption of these relatively new tech-
nologies by farmers remains a major challenge, and early 
case studies suggest integrated control has not been as effec-
tive as elimination strategies (Diall et al. 2017).
Undertaking any elimination program requires not only 
technological ability but also social and political support, 
along with sufficient funding (Vreysen et  al. 2014). Since 
2001, under the umbrella of the African Union, African 
governments have been implementing PATTEC with the 
explicit objective to eradicate the tsetse fly in Africa (Kabayo 
2002). In Senegal, the program is supported by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, with financial help 
from the United States. This elimination project, including a 
SIT component, cost $8.5 million for a 1000-km2 project area 
in Senegal (Bouyer et al. 2014) and $5.7 million for a 1650-
km2 area in Zanzibar (Bouyer et  al. 2014). Although it is 
costly, elimination of isolated tsetse fly populations (Vreysen 
et  al. 2013) is considered to be the best economic strategy 
(Bouyer et al. 2014), given the long-term benefits it produces 
(Shaw et  al. 2014). As such, despite technical and finan-
cial challenges, tsetse fly elimination campaigns will likely 
increase with the general economic development of Africa.
Although political, economic, and technical conditions 
and capabilities are generally conducive to tsetse fly elimi-
nation, the important ethical question remains: Is tsetse fly 
elimination morally appropriate? Because tsetse flies disap-
peared from North America millions of years ago (Cockerell 
1907), tsetse fly distribution is presently restricted to Africa. 
Continent-wide eradication of tsetse flies, as was proposed 
by the PATTEC program, would result in the extinction of 
the entire tsetse fly family (Glossinidaea), including 31 spe-
cies and subspecies. Alternatively, past experience suggests 
that elimination technologies can be used to create pest-free 
areas, which allow agricultural production without world-
wide eradication of entire species. An excellent example is 
the elimination of the medfly (Ceratitis capitata) in the Los 
Angeles basin in 1996 using SIT, followed by preventive 
releases, which still continue today (Hendrichs et al. 2002). 
This program was highly successful technically, economi-
cally, politically, and environmentally, and it addressed public 
opposition to recurrent aerial bait spraying over urban areas.
Next, we examine the ethical basis for these two options 
by considering whether they appropriately reflect accepted 
notions of value and concomitant moral obligations. As a 
terminological note, in the discussion that follows we use the 
word elimination to refer to localized programs directed at 
removing tsetse fly populations. We use the word eradication 
to refer to programs whose objective is to remove tsetse flies 
Figure 1. A wild tsetse fly (Glossina palpalis gambiensis) 
in a protected gallery forest near the “mare aux 
hippopotames,” Burkina Faso. Photograph: Olivier Esnault.
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from Africa altogether, which, to reiterate, would effectively 
bring multiple tsetse fly species to extinction.
The ethics of elimination and eradication
Ethics is a broad domain, including, among other things, 
considerations of justice, care, welfare, duty, and rights. A 
full ethical analysis of tsetse fly elimination is far beyond the 
scope of this article, so we narrow our focus to attributions 
of value. Value is a basic underpinning of moral obligation: 
How we value an entity informs normative beliefs about 
how we ought to treat or interact with that entity (Elliot 
1992). We also limit our discussion of value to ecological 
Box 1. Presentation, taxonomy and biology of tsetse flies.
Tsetse flies (Diptera: Glossinidae) are Brachycera Cyclorrhapha Diptera, Schizophora and Calyptratae, close to Muscoidae, from which 
they differ by the adaptation of their mouthparts to blood sucking (Solano et al. 2010). The single genus (Glossina) includes three 
subgenera and 31 species and subspecies. The three subgenera are subgenus Nemorhina (also known as the Palpalis group), subgenus 
Glossina sensu stricto (Morsitans group) and subgenus Austenina (Fusca group). They are the sole cyclical vector of trypanosomes 
that go through a full extrinsic development cycle in their definite host before being transferred to vertebrates during a bite (Solano 
et al. 2010). All tsetse fly species can potentially transmit trypanosomes but their relative importance depends on the intensity of their 
contacts with susceptible hosts. The Morsitans and Palpalis groups, mainly found in natural savannahs and riverine forest vegetation 
respectively, are the most important epidemiologically.
Living a very long time for a fly, 50–100 days, but up to 8 months in captivity, its reproduction cycle is more similar to that of mam-
mals than to a domestic fly: It has very few offspring (5–10) that are carried by the ovoviviparous female in its uterus and fed thanks to 
milky glands. Larvae are laid every 10 days on the ground, where they immediately metamorphose into pupae and then into imagoes 
without requiring any extra food resources in the environment.
Box 2. Relative epidemiological importance of tsetse fly species.
The different species contribute to very different degrees to the transmission of human and animal African trypanosomes. In the case 
of sleeping sickness, Glossina fuscipes subspecies are responsible for approximately 90% of human cases and together with Glossina 
palpalis subspecies, they are probably responsible for close to 100% of the cases of the Gambian form of the disease (T. brucei gam-
biense), which represents approximately 97% of human cases (Simarro et al. 2010). This is all the more intriguing considering that in 
the past, these two species complexes were considered to be subspecies (G. palpalis palpalis and G. palpalis fuscipes): The importance 
of these vectors is mainly due to a strong resilience to human changes, with populations found in major capital cities such as Conakri, 
Abidjan or Kinshasa. G. fuscipes SL is also a major vector of the Rhodesian form of the disease (T. brucei rhodesiense). G. swynnertoni, 
G. morsitans morsitans and G. pallidipes are also important vectors for this form, particularly at the wildlife reservoir interface.
Considering African animal trypanosomosis (AAT), species of the Morsitans group were originally the most important vectors (Solano 
et al. 2010) and this is still the case in eastern and southern Africa, where large protected areas still offer “bed and board” for their 
persistency, leading to the interface cycle, which is clearly the most dangerous for cattle (Van den Bossche et al. 2010). However, in 
western Africa, the Palpalis group is presently responsible for most animal cases, thanks to its resilience to anthropic changes, and with 
increasing human encroachment, this situation is currently extending to most of Africa.
The Fusca group, corresponding to almost 50% of known species and subspecies, is generally very sensitive to human encroachment, 
specific to wild hosts, and generally has little epidemiological impact, with the exception of Glossina brevipalpis in southern Africa, 
which can be an efficient vector of AAT. Most species, such as Glossina medicorum in Burkina Faso, have a distribution, which is lim-
ited to specific types of vegetation, do not feed at all on humans, and have almost no contact with livestock.
Box 3. Tsetse fly control methods.
The sterile insect technique (SIT) is based on the release of irradiated males that sterilize wild females as unfertile mates. SIT is clearly 
the technique with all the necessary “qualities” for species elimination (Dyck et al. 2005), because its efficiency increases when the tar-
get population is only present at low density. In Senegal, SIT is crucial for elimination (Dicko et al. 2014). The sequential aerosol tech-
nique (SAT) is based on the aerial spraying of microdroplets of a formulation containing pyrethroids used at very low doses (0.33–0.35 
grams of active ingredient per hectare). It is very efficient against the Morsitans group in open environments (Kgori et al. 2006) but 
more difficult to use against the Palpalis group in dense vegetation or in hilly areas (De Deken and Bouyer 2018). Finally, the two other 
available methods of controlling tsetse flies are insecticide treated targets (ITT) and cattle (ITC). ITT is the use of a visually attractive 
device generally impregnated with pyrethroids (Rayaisse et al. 2012). Their attractiveness can be increased by the use of odour baits 
(Rayaisse et al. 2010). In the case of ITC, cattle—or pigs—are impregnated with pyrethroids and used as live baits (Ndeledje et al. 2013).
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collectives (species and populations), setting aside the value 
of individual tsetse flies (but see, e.g., Taylor 1981, Vucetich 
and Nelson 2007, Wallach et  al. 2018 for perspectives on 
obligations to individual living beings). Numerous types of 
value are attributed to species, including intrinsic and vari-
ous instrumental values (discussed below), relational values 
(Chan et al. 2016), and transformative values (Norton 2014). 
We focus on the first two types, because they are relatively 
well established and widely endorsed within the conserva-
tion community (United Nations 1992, Trombulak et  al. 
2004).
Instrumental values
Instrumental value lies solely with an entity’s utility or func-
tion as a means to an end. Ethically, we have no moral obli-
gations to entities possessing only instrumental value. Such 
entities are properly regarded as objects and warrant only 
indirect moral concern, to the extent that they contribute 
to some inherently worthy end (Muraca 2011). Species have 
innumerable instrumental values for humans (as well as for 
biological communities and ecosystems), but species also 
arguably have disvalues (Morito 2003) or provide disservices 
(McCauley 2006) that counteract the human good. This 
observation is exemplified by so-called pest species, such as 
tsetse flies, which actively detract from human well-being.
In practical terms, we can compare instrumental values 
and disvalues by calculating the relative benefits and costs 
associated with a species. Following strict utilitarian logic, 
we ought ethically to pursue elimination programs whose 
total value or benefit exceeds the value or benefit associated 
with the species’ persistence. To clarify this chain of rea-
soning, we will provide a formal argument for elimination 
premised on the instrumental values and disvalues of tsetse 
flies. An argument, formally, is a logical sequence composed 
of premises (P) leading to a conclusion (C). For an argu-
ment to be sound, it must have a valid structure; that is, the 
conclusion must follow necessarily from the premises, and 
all the premises must be true or otherwise justified (Copi 
Figure 2. Habitat of tsetse flies (Glossina palpalis gambiensis) in the Niayes area of Senegal. Old Euphorbia edges provide 
the suitable microclimate necessary for the flies to circulate between patches of anthropic and natural tree habitats. 
Photograph: Jérémy Bouyer.
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and Cohen 2008, Nelson and Vucetich 2012). An analysis 
of arguments is a basic method of the scholarly discipline of 
ethics and, as such, is well suited to the discussion at hand.
The utilitarian argument outlined above can be formu-
lated as follows: (P1) Tsetse fly elimination provides benefits. 
(P2) Tsetse fly elimination incurs costs. (P3) The benefits 
of tsetse fly elimination exceed the costs. (P4) A program 
whose benefits exceed costs should be implemented. (C) 
Therefore, tsetse fly elimination should be implemented.
P1 is certainly true. Widely recognized as a significant 
contributor to the African continent’s continuing struggle 
to emerge from economic, social, and political problems, 
the tsetse fly has been named “The Poverty Fly” and even 
“Africa’s Bane,” because of its negative impacts on both 
human and animal health (Nash 1969, Kabayo 2002). There 
is solid correlative reason to believe that the removal of 
tsetse flies, and trypanosomosis by extension, would have 
substantial direct and indirect benefits for local communi-
ties, enhancing opportunities for rural development. For 
example, two economic surveys conducted 2 and 5 years 
after completion of a local tsetse fly elimination campaign 
in Zanzibar revealed a substantial increase in the number 
of small farmers holding cattle (from 31% to 94%), hold-
ing improved cattle breeds (from 2% to 24%), selling milk 
(from 10% to 62%), and using oxen for ploughing (from 5% 
to more than 60%; Vreysen et  al. 2014). In addition, milk 
production tripled and the average income per month of 
farming households increased by 30% (Vreysen et al. 2014). 
In eastern Africa, a recent FAO study estimated that the 
average benefits to livestock keepers would be approximately 
$160 per km2 per year (Shaw et al. 2014). In Senegal, a tsetse 
fly elimination project (Dicko et al. 2014) is projected to lead 
to a threefold increase in milk and meat sales, correspond-
ing to approximately $3720 per km2 per year, to the benefit 
of local farmers (Bouyer et al. 2014). Although the financial 
costs of tsetse fly elimination are significant, as was noted 
earlier, the net effect is arguably beneficial, considering not 
only economic outcomes but also the dramatic improvement 
in human health. Therefore, setting aside P4 for the time 
being (we return to it below), the argument premised on 
relative costs and benefits of tsetse fly elimination appears 
to be sound.
However, critics may point out that the relative benefits 
and costs of tsetse fly elimination have not been accurately 
accounted in the discussion above. Specifically, if costs 
are more broadly conceived, to encompass more than just 
financial expenses associated with elimination, the costs of 
elimination may not be outweighed by resulting benefits. In 
this case, by the same reasoning outlined above, cost–benefit 
analysis would not justify implementation of an elimina-
tion program. In other words, (P1) Tsetse fly elimination 
provides benefits. (P2) Tsetse fly elimination incurs costs. 
(P3) The costs of tsetse fly elimination exceed the benefits. 
(P4) A program whose costs exceed benefits should not be 
implemented. (C) Therefore, tsetse fly elimination should 
not be implemented.
The broader suite of costs encompassed in P2 might 
include adverse effects on food chains, nontarget organisms, 
and protected areas. A closely related critique might alter-
natively contend not that the costs of tsetse fly elimination 
outweigh the benefits, but that the ostensive benefits of tse-
tse fly elimination would not actually materialize. We briefly 
evaluate each of these possibilities next.
Adverse effects on food chains
One concern is the adverse impact of tsetse fly elimination 
on the food chain. Tsetse fly adults and pupae are predated by 
a variety of predators including vertebrates and arthropods 
(Rogers and Randolph 1990). These predator species could 
suffer from tsetse fly elimination at the local scale. However, 
no insectivorous species is currently known to solely feed on 
tsetse flies, and the reduction in insectivorous birds during 
tsetse fly control campaigns is more likely due to the simul-
taneous insecticide-related removal of other insect species, 
such as horseflies, than to the disappearance of tsetse flies 
themselves (De Garine-Wichatitsky et  al. 2001). In addi-
tion, tsetse flies are purely hematophagous, and unlike, for 
example, horseflies, they are not involved in pollination (De 
Garine-Wichatitsky et  al. 2001). Unquestionably, however, 
the significance of tsetse flies to local food chains should be 
carefully assessed in context before any elimination effort 
begins, because the potential for adverse effects may be spe-
cific to the group that is targeted. For example, food chain 
effects were found to be an important issue in mosquito 
elimination (Pace et al. 1999).
Adverse effects on nontarget organisms
Perhaps of greater concern is the impact of elimination 
techniques on nontarget organisms. Grant (2001) reviewed 
the environmental impacts of tsetse fly control operations 
and showed that the impacts have gradually declined over 
time, from deliberate destruction of host populations of 
wild mammals and tsetse fly habitat prior to the 1940s to 
severe wildlife mortality associated with the toxic effects of 
residual insecticides used in the 1950s and then to relatively 
minor effects on nontarget insect and arthropod populations 
through the use of nonresidual insecticide techniques (SAT, 
mainly based on endosulfan and pyrethroids) beginning in 
the 1970s (Adam et al. 2013). The reduction of environmen-
tal impacts associated with tsetse fly control culminated with 
the use of insecticide targets and traps that allow a specific 
delivery to tsetse flies but also affecting other biting flies, 
including Tabanidae and Stomoxyinae, and more generally 
to a variety of dipterans. SIT is specific (box 3) and has no 
impact on nontargeted species. It is classified as environ-
ment friendly. For SAT, the insecticide dosage is very low 
(box  3), and environmental monitoring showed that its 
impact on nontarget organisms was low and temporary. 
Inferences from these monitoring programs are limited, 
because most monitoring programs are short lived and not 
focused on the species level. As such, continuous monitoring 
in situ is recommended.
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ITT (box 3), on the other hand, is not specific and many 
other insect groups are attracted to the device. Furthermore, 
targets must be placed at regular intervals (4–30 per km2), 
which generally requires building hundreds of kilometres of 
trails. Targets have an effect on habitat use by several spe-
cies of large and medium-size wild mammals (De Garine-
Wichatitsky et  al. 2001), and the trails can give poachers 
access to national parks and game reserves. ITC (box 3) can 
affect cattle dung fauna (Vale et al. 2004), although reduc-
ing the insecticide treatment to tsetse fly feeding sites (leg 
extremities and belly) can reduce the amount of insecticide 
needed tenfold.
Although ITT and ITC are known to have adverse 
impacts on nontarget organisms, it is important to real-
ize that both technologies are also used in integrated 
control by farmers (Bouyer et al. 2013). As such, negative 
impacts associated with these technologies are not limited 
to tsetse fly elimination programs and would also poten-
tially result from alternative strategies of integrated pest 
control. In fact, if completed quickly, tsetse fly elimina-
tion may even have less impact on nontarget species than 
traditional continuous control programs do. Permanent 
control using traps, poisoned bait, or aerial spraying of 
broad spectrum insecticides has wide-ranging negative 
effects on biodiversity (Ogada 2014). For example, the 
increasing use of insecticides on farmland affects 80% of 
threatened butterfly species in Europe (van Swaay et  al. 
2006). Expeditious and effective elimination programs 
might preclude such detrimental effects. A mass-rearing 
facility in Guatemala, for instance, produced upward 
of 2000 million sterile medfly males per week to help 
maintain the containment barrier with a minimum of 
insecticide use. Had medfly not been contained, 640 tons 
of insecticide would have needed to be applied annually to 
farms in California alone (Siebert and Cooper 1995). The 
ongoing use of insecticides can also lead to chronic toxic-
ity in humans (Cimino et  al. 2017). Between integrated 
control and tsetse fly elimination, in some cases, the latter 
may more effectively limit adverse impacts on nontarget 
organisms.
Adverse effects on protected areas
Tsetse fly elimination might increase human and animal 
encroachment inside protected areas or their vicinity. For 
example, in Zimbabwe, tsetse fly elimination favoured the 
expansion of arable fields and subsequently reduced the 
presence of elephants (Murwira et  al. 2010). Geographic 
range contraction of tsetse flies due to climate change 
might also allow cattle production to occur in areas in 
which it was not feasible before, potentially increasing the 
likelihood of negative interactions between herders and 
large carnivores, such as African lions (Panthera leo; Carter 
et al. 2018). On the other hand, tsetse flies can increase spa-
tial competition between extensive cattle-raising systems 
and protected areas by rendering intensive cattle rearing 
systems impossible. Extensive cattle-raising systems can 
increase competition with wild fauna for land and are a 
major cause of land degradation and ecosystem distur-
bance through overgrazing (figure 3; Budde et al. 2004). In 
Burkina Faso, particularly in the peripheral areas of pro-
tected forests, such as the transboundary W Regional Park 
or around the Comoé-Léraba protected area, biodiversity 
has declined dramatically with the increase in human 
activities and extensive cattle breeding systems, despite 
the continuing presence of the tsetse fly at high densities. 
One study suggests that a tsetse fly elimination program in 
Senegal, coupled with use of improved trypano-sensitive 
cattle breeds, would, in fact, decrease herd sizes while 
increasing farmer revenue (Bouyer et  al. 2014). Whether 
the tsetse fly is a guardian of wild fauna (Rogers and 
Randolph 1988) is therefore debatable and depends on both 
social and ecological conditions.
Figure 3. Animal shown is a cross-breed between a 
trypanotolerant breed (Ndama) and a meat breed 
(Gobra) in the Niayes area of Senegal. The removal of 
trypanosomosis allows a genetic improvement of local 
breeds associated to a three folds increase of animal sales 
(milk and meat) associated to a 45% reduction of cattle 
herd size. Photograph: Jean-Jacques Etienne.
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No benefits
A final concern pertinent to the elimination of tsetse flies, 
or any species, is that elimination will create an empty niche. 
The empty niche might then quickly be occupied by another 
species (Myers N 1993), which could cause even more dam-
age than the original pest. In this scenario, the benefits of 
elimination would not be realized and so would certainly 
not outweigh the costs. However, this concern is likely not 
founded with regard to tsetse fly elimination. Tsetse fly are 
cyclical or biological vectors of African Trypanosoma spe-
cies, including Trypanosoma brucei sl, T. congolense and T. 
vivax, whereby the parasites multiply within the insect body. 
In the absence of tsetse flies, Tabanidae and Stomoxinae 
could continue to transmit the parasites mechanically—that 
is, by acting as a flying syringe (Desquesnes et  al. 2009). 
This outcome may seem likely for Trypanosoma vivax only, 
which is present worldwide even where tsetse flies are not 
and efficiently transmitted mechanically. T. vivax is the only 
example of a trypanosome species transmitted both biologi-
cally by tsetse flies and mechanically by other insects, and 
this species cannot contaminate human beings. Moreover, 
all trypanosomes, including T. vivax, disappeared from 
Zanzibar after tsetse flies were locally eliminated, so their 
mechanical transmission is not always sufficient to maintain 
them (Vreysen et al. 2014).
The commentary thus far has highlighted costs, benefits, 
and other impacts of local elimination programs and, on 
the basis of our analysis, it seems the instrumental values 
associated with local elimination generally outweigh the 
disvalues. However, as a general guideline, we recommend 
impacts (or lack thereof) should be assessed in context. To 
this end, we provide a rubric for evaluation (table  1). The 
rubric is intended to enable transparent decision-making 
and includes the socioeconomic effects of the species, the 
political, economic, and technical feasibility of elimination, 
and the ecological and environmental effects of elimination.
Do instrumental values support global eradication?
Before moving on to intrinsic value, it is critical to recognize 
that instrumental values (benefits) associated with tsetse 
flies must be accounted differently when we consider com-
plete eradication of the species. Although individual tsetse 
flies and local populations provide no known benefits for 
humans, there is a unique and potentially significant form 
of instrumental value associated with the species as a whole, 
which would vanish were the species brought to extinction. 
We call these unknown values—that is, the not yet realized 
or not yet known value tsetse flies may have (Ibrahim et al. 
2013). As we have learned about the far-reaching conse-
quences of human-induced depletion of animal and plant 
species on ecosystem resilience and even human welfare 
(Seddon et al. 2014), our appreciation of value in the natural 
world has expanded beyond utility alone, to include the full 
range of services provided by ecosystems and biodiversity 
Table 1. A general rubric for evaluating the desirability of eliminating local populations of an endemic species.
Category Questions Answers for the tsetse fly
Socioeconomic effects of the 
species
Is the species negatively affecting 
human health?
Yes, tsetse flies are the vectors of human sleeping sickness, a 
neglected tropical disease affecting the poorest populations in Africa
Is the species negatively affecting 
human livelihoods?
Yes, tsetse flies are also vectors of animal trypanosomosis, which 
is reducing the overall cattle productions by 30%, also hampering 
integrated farming and innovation in cattle breeding.
Political, economic, and technical 
feasibility of elimination
Is there a political will to eliminate 
the species?
Yes, PATTEC initiative launched in 2001 by African states and 
supported by the African Union.
Is elimination of the species cost 
effective?
Yes, as has been demonstrated by several benefit–cost studies.
Is it technically possible to 
eliminate the species?
Yes, elimination achieved in several countries and territories
Is elimination a long-term solution? Mostly no, although eliminating some isolated populations of certain 
species appears to be a long-term solution.
Ecological and environmental 
effects of elimination
Would elimination of the species 
lead to an empty niche?
No. Not observed in territories in which tsetse flies were eliminated 
more than 20 years ago.
Would elimination of the species 
have negative effects on other 
species in the food chain?
No. On the basis of current knowledge, tsetse flies have no important 
roles in food chains and no specific predators. They are predating 
vertebrates for blood.
Would the elimination process 
negatively affect nontarget species?
No. Current control techniques are very specific and only have 
transitory impacts on nontarget species. Expeditious tsetse fly 
elimination would reduce insecticide use that can be ecotoxic.
Would elimination negatively affect 
nontarget species?
Possibly yes. Tsetse flies can influence the relationship between 
domestic and wild fauna as well as the density of cattle. Necessity 
for agroecological development plan in case of elimination to mitigate 
risks.
Note: This rubric is based on instrumental values or disvalues associated with local elimination and therefore does not incorporate the intrinsic 
value of the species. For each category, we present global questions that should be addressed to decide the desirability of elimination to serve 
as a guideline for decision-making and then summarize replies for the specific case of tsetse flies. 
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(Costanza et  al. 2017). Human values may continue to 
change over time, as we learn more about the natural world 
and our viewpoints correspondingly shift (Singer 2011). One 
could argue that the potential instrumental value of species 
positively outweighs any known costs associated with them, 
in which case their eradication would not be justified on 
utilitarian grounds (Myers N 1993). But even rejecting the 
strong claim that unknown benefits outweigh known costs, 
because unknown values are (by definition) unknown, so 
too are the magnitude and significance of the benefits they 
provide. Without knowing the magnitude or significance 
benefits tsetse flies may provide, it is impossible to weigh 
these benefits against other (known) benefits and costs. 
Therefore, in the context of species eradication, P3 is not 
necessarily true. As such, arguments predicated entirely on 
instrumental value do not provide compelling support for 
global tsetse fly eradication.
Beyond instrumental value
The argument outlined above can be considered sound 
within a singularly instrumentalist framework. That is, if the 
overarching objective of decision-making is to maximize net 
benefits relative to costs, as was summarized succinctly in P4 
above, it appears elimination of local tsetse fly populations is 
supported. However, as was noted earlier, the conservation 
community writ large also acknowledges the intrinsic value 
of species (United Nations 1992, Trombulak et  al. 2004). 
With this acknowledgement, an ethical premise such as P4, 
stating that an elimination program is justified entirely by 
the relative balance of benefits and costs that result, cannot 
be considered appropriate. As is explained next, once a spe-
cies is attributed intrinsic value, it can no longer be treated 
merely as an instrumental means to (human) ends. This is 
not to suggest instrumental values are irrelevant. Although 
inherently ethical (Soulé 1985), species conservation and 
management are also conditioned by broader social, eco-
nomic, and political contexts (Brechin et al. 2002), in which 
knowledge of instrumental value and disvalue is essential to 
informed decision-making. But if we are committed to the 
claim that species possess intrinsic value, ethical analysis 
cannot be reduced to a mere calculation of net benefits and 
costs for humans.
Intrinsic value
Intrinsic value is the value of an entity as an end in itself, 
beyond and regardless of any utility (or disutility) it may 
possess (Vucetich et  al. 2015). Intrinsic value is a basic 
property of goodness in the world: When we acknowledge 
intrinsic value, we acknowledge its bearer as a good in itself 
and for its own sake (Batavia and Nelson 2017). Unlike 
instrumental value, intrinsic value is generally believed to 
imply that humans, as moral agents, have direct moral obli-
gations toward its bearers (Rolston 1991). These obligations 
can generally be summarized as the obligation to respect or 
promote the good (e.g., Rolston 1991, Moore and Baldwin 
1993, Davison 2012). In this sense, attributing species with 
intrinsic value suggests species ought to be protected and 
promoted, even if they actively combat human ends. In 
argument form, (P1) All species have intrinsic value. (P2) 
Entities with intrinsic value are worthy of protection and 
promotion. (P3) Tsetse flies are species. (C) Therefore, tsetse 
fly species are worthy of protection and promotion.
Needless to say, complete and intentional eradication of 
the species is not consistent with the obligation to protect 
and promote, so recognition of intrinsic value seems to 
provide compelling grounds against tsetse fly eradication. 
But are localized elimination measures also incommensurate 
with the intrinsic value of tsetse flies?
Elimination would be targeted at populations rather than 
at species as a whole, so it is reasonable to begin by asking 
whether tsetse fly populations also have intrinsic value. 
Conventional grounds for the intrinsic value of species 
include their evolution as unique and historically continu-
ous corporate entities with an interest in continued existence 
and flourishing (Rolston 1991, Johnson 1993, Smith 2016). 
These conditions do not obviously obtain in the case of 
populations. On the other hand, Davison (2012) argues that 
it is ultimately arbitrary to attribute intrinsic value to some 
things in existence and deny the intrinsic value of others. 
Accepting this argument would suggest we are obligated to 
assume tsetse fly populations have intrinsic value, unless a 
sound case can be made to the contrary. It is beyond our 
scope in the present article to conclude that populations do 
or do not have intrinsic value. However, it seems reasonable 
to suggest they at least have constitutive value—that is, value 
to the extent that populations constitute intrinsically valu-
able tsetse fly species (see Kirschenmann 2001 for an acces-
sible explanation). To recognize constitutive value would 
not imply direct moral obligations to tsetse fly populations, 
just as we would not generally acknowledge or uphold 
direct moral obligations to the individual cells constituting 
a human being. But it would also be inappropriate to wan-
tonly harm constitutive elements of an intrinsically valuable 
entity; at a certain point, harming a person’s cells would also 
harm the person’s organs, appendages, and, eventually, her 
or his collective being. In a similar way, recognizing intrinsic 
value in tsetse fly species implies we should not gratuitously 
inflict harm against the species or its constitutive elements, 
such as populations.
But what qualifies as a nongratuitous harm? A categorical 
maxim condemning any harm against bearers of intrinsic 
value (or their constitutive elements) can lead to absurd and 
practically untenable conclusions. We must kill to eat and eat 
to live, after all, and it seems unreasonable that we would be 
morally impugned by our basic biological needs. Some phi-
losophers have proposed contingency clauses whereby, given 
genuine trade-offs between multiple intrinsically valuable 
entities, necessary harms can be incurred to protect higher 
interests or promote the overall good (e.g., VanDeVeer 
1995, Sterba 1998). This may be a useful framework for the 
case at hand. We suggest localized elimination represents 
a defensible compromise as long as harm to tsetse flies is 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bioscience/article/69/2/125/5248398 by cirad-4 user on 21 Septem
ber 2020
Forum
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience  February 2019 / Vol. 69 No. 2 • BioScience   133 
minimized and enacted with due restraint. Elimination 
techniques diligently, cautiously, and selectively applied to 
target populations that actively compromise human com-
munities appropriately recognize and promote the intrinsic 
value of human beings and human welfare but also attend to 
the intrinsic value of tsetse fly species by granting them due 
consideration and subsequently exercising moderation in 
enacting harm against their constitutive populations.
Conclusions
African governments have launched PATTEC with the sup-
port of the African Union to eradicate continent-wide what 
has been called the “fly of death.” Given the ethical consid-
erations discussed in the present article, we suggest there is a 
good case to be made against the global eradication of tsetse 
fly species. However, we also suggest it is ethically defensible 
to eliminate the isolated populations that are main vectors of 
disease for humans and their domestic animals. Eliminating 
populations of tsetse fly will minimally harm the species 
but greatly benefit human and animal health and welfare 
and will improve the socioeconomic development and food 
security of the countries concerned. We recommend that 
elimination programs can and should use techniques that 
have the lowest impact ecologically and on the species. 
These impacts should be carefully monitored and elimina-
tion programs regularly and comprehensively reevaluated. 
The rubric provided in table 1 provides a starting point 
for conducting comprehensive evaluations. Human values 
toward tsetse fly and the species they affect will almost cer-
tainly change in the future, so ethical analysis should also be 
included in regular reevaluations.
Above, we discussed instrumental and intrinsic values 
separately, without offering any commentary about how to 
handle both in decision-making contexts. This is a challeng-
ing task. Instrumental values (or disvalues) are obvious and 
often quantifiable, and therefore conducive to comparison 
and trade-offs (Maguire and Justus 2008). Intrinsic value, 
on the other hand, is a concept we struggle even to iden-
tify or understand, let alone operationalize (Batavia and 
Nelson 2017). For instance, although the CBD has codified 
intrinsic value, highlighting it preeminently in the very first 
words of the text (https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/), the 
convention also provides criteria in annex I for prioritizing 
components of biological diversity important for conserva-
tion and sustainable use (Hochkirch et al. 2017). Generally, 
these criteria favor instrumental values, such as “medicinal, 
agricultural, or other economic value,” leading us to question 
what intrinsic value means (or why it matters) from a policy 
perspective, if instrumental values take priority in practical 
decision-making contexts.
We suggest that it is important to consider intrinsic 
value as a separate type of value rather than attempting to 
weigh or adjudicate intrinsic against instrumental values. 
Incorporating intrinsic value into decision contexts will less 
resemble a calculation than an overarching frame of refer-
ence, which shapes how other values are accounted and other 
factors weighed (Batavia and Nelson 2017). This approach to 
decision-making may not be as concrete or quantitatively jus-
tifiable as a structured exercise such as cost–benefit analysis 
but is arguably just as important if not more so to practical 
ethics. To create space for intrinsic value, we suggest ethical 
inquiry in issues of conservation should not be undertaken 
with a singular or even primary objective to arrive at one 
verifiably “right” solution. We counsel that decision-makers 
should instead adopt a more basic normative orientation 
toward wise conduct, an aspiration that might otherwise be 
characterized as a commitment to virtue (Heller and Hobbs 
2014). In this light, we suggest the increasingly common cases 
in which we are tasked to juggle a plurality of instrumental 
and intrinsic values are best addressed through rational ethi-
cal discourse, as was demonstrated above, but also guided by 
virtues such as restraint, humility, prudence, and benevo-
lence. It is with these virtues in mind that we suggest localized 
elimination of tsetse fly populations is morally justified to the 
extent that it enhances human flourishing without compro-
mising or unnecessarily harming the tsetse fly species.
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